The Key Authority - Secure Key Management in Hierarchical Public Key
  Infrastructures by Wiesmaier, A. et al.
ar
X
iv
:c
s/0
41
00
24
v1
  [
cs
.C
R]
  1
2 O
ct 
20
04
The Key Authority – Secure Key Management in
Hierarchical Public Key Infrastructures
Alexander Wiesmaier, Marcus Lippert, Vangelis Karatsiolis
Technische Universita¨t Darmstadt
Department of Computer Science
Hochschulstr. 10; D-64289 Darmstadt, Germany
Tel: +49-6151-164889; Fax: +49-6151-166036
Abstract— We model a private key’s life cycle as a finite state
machine. The states are the key’s phases of life and the transition
functions describe tasks to be done with the key. Based on this
we define and describe the key authority, a trust center module,
which potentiates the easy enforcement of secure management
of private keys in hierarchical public key infrastructures. This is
done by assembling all trust center tasks concerning the crucial
handling of private keys within one centralized module. As this
module resides under full control of the trust center’s carrier
it can easily be protected by well-known organizational and
technical measures.
Index Terms— Certification Authority, Hierarchical Trust, Key
Management, PKI, Public Key Infrastructure, Trust Center
I. INTRODUCTION
This section introduces the reader into the matter of this
paper. At first, the scope of this paper is motivated. Then the
problem we address with this paper is stated. Finally, some
related work is presented.
A. Motivation
Nowadays a significant and growing contingent of com-
munication is done electronically over (often open) computer
networks. In many cases, it is necessary to guarantee the
confidentiality, the integrity and the authenticity of the thereby
incurring electronic data [1]. This can be achieved most
reasonably by means of hierarchical public key infrastructures
[2].
B. Problem
Following [3] the public key infrastructure itself must
be secure in order to provide a proper degree of security.
Consistently with [4] we assume that the use of the private
key is necessary and sufficient for the decryption of a cipher.
Of course, we assume the same for the creation of a digital
signature. Thus, the handling of private keys is the most
crucial domain within a public key infrastructure. The problem
addressed in this paper is how to achieve secure management
of private keys within hierarchical public key infrastructures.
C. Related work
In the last years, there were many publications concerning
topics around public key infrastructures. A lot of them deal
with concerns of certification [5], [6], [7] and revocation
[8], [9], [10]. An other often attended field is the topic of
trust and its chaining [11], [12], [13]. It was recognized that
the enforcement of revocations and policies is achieved most
easily in hierarchical public key infrastructures [11]. However,
there seems to be no publication dealing with how to achieve
secure key management within a hierarchical public key
infrastructure. Except a couple of proposed security measures1,
there appears to be no relevant work.
II. PRIVATE KEYS
This section looks at the main topic of this paper: Private
keys within a hierarchical public key infrastructure. Firstly, the
life cycle of private keys is considered. Then we care about
own and foreign private keys. Lastly, we look at the security
of private keys.
A. Life cycle
Figure 1 shows a simplified life cycle of a private key
within a public key infrastructure. Other thinkable life cycles
may contain more or less steps as well as other connections.
However, here the point of interest is not the exact life cycle
but an overview over the stations in a private key’s life.
Thus, simplified here does not mean that some things were
skipped. It means that things are as concrete as necessary but
as abstract as possible in order to reflect a common life cycle
in a preferably simple diagram. For example, you can think of
a special key generation algorithm with possible private key
recovery from the public key. This can be viewed as being
a conventional key generation algorithm with mandatory key
backup.
We model the life cycle of a private key as a finite state
machine. Each phase in a private key’s life is represented by
an appropriate state of the machine. Having these states, it is
easy to construct the transition function. We interpret those
transitions as the tasks to be done with a private key within
a public key infrastructure. One instance of the finite state
machine belongs to exactly one instance of a private key. If
we have more than one instances of the same key each of
them is assigned its own finite state machine. The following
paragraphs explain the various states and transition functions
in detail and look at their security aspects.
1e.g. those associated with the German ”signature act” [14], [15], [16]
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A PRIVATE KEY’S LIFE CYCLE
1) States:
a) Non-existing: This is the initial and at the same time
the final state of our finite state machine. This is a virtual state.
Being in this state, means that the private key was destroyed
or that it has never existed at all. In this state, a private key is
absolutely secure, at the same time the key is also absolutely
useless, since it does not exist.
b) Storable: The first real state in a private key’s life
is being storable. This means the key was just generated,
copied or recovered and exists in the memory of a computer, a
smartcard or any other hardware. Now the key has to be stored
or deposited somewhere to make it persistent. This state is very
dangerous, and the unprotected key has to be shielded against
eavesdropping or manipulating.
c) Deposited: For purposes of backup or similar cases,
the private key can be deposited. The key remains inactive in
this state until it is recovered. The deposited key may have to
persist over a long time. It must be easy for authorized parties
to recover the private key, while this must be impossible for
unauthorized parties.
d) Deliverable: To be delivered to the participant the
private key should be stored in a cryptographic token. Usually
the token is personalized and specially secured in this state.
Being in this state the private key should be properly protected
by the token. As these tokens are usually protected by secret
pass phrases it is necessary for them to remain a secret. In
addition, the token must be shielded against manipulating or
interchanging.
e) Usable: This is the really intended state of each
private key. Now the key is hold by its participant, who is
able to use it. Here the key also has to be protected against
eavesdropping and manipulating. This is particular difficult
because the key must be handled in clear for using it and
the ”unqualified” end user is involved.
2) Transition functions:
a) Generate: The first thing in a new private keys life
cycle is always its generation. For gaining good keys, the
key parameters have to be chosen carefully. Choosing bad
parameters may result in gaining insecure keys. In addition, a
good random number generator has to be used. Using a bad
random generator may result in obtaining predictable keys.
Further, the key generation unit has to be shielded against
eavesdropping or manipulation. Thus, generating keys is a very
sensitive step and has to be done with expertise in a suitable
environment.
b) Copy: Sometimes it is desirable to have more than
one instance of the same key. Thus, beside the generation of a
fresh key we have the possibility to construct a new instance
by copying it from an existing one. Copying private keys is
somewhat delicate because copying a private key is usually
what is to be prevented. Depending on the kind of utilized
token it is not in all or even in none state possible to make a
copy of the private key. If the copying unit handles unprotected
private keys or pass phrases it has to be shielded like the key
generation unit.
c) Deposit: Depositing a private key is not as easy as
it seems to be at first glance. The key must be deposited in
a way that enables a long period of persistence and at the
same time features a maximum of access protection. It is not
suitable to just save it somewhere. A strong access protection
method is to be applied to the key and it must be stored in a
persistence-guaranteeing manner.
d) Recover: Recovering a deposited key is the third and
last method for constructing an instance of a private key.
Just like generating and copying a key, the recovery has to
be shielded against eavesdropping or manipulation. It must
be guaranteed that authorized parties can easily recover the
desired key, while this must be impossible for unauthorized
parties.
e) Store: To make the key deliverable it should be
stored in some kind of cryptographic token, which is usually
protected by secret pass phrases. For storing purposes, it is
necessary to handle the private key and the pass phrases in
clear text. Thus, appropriate shielding of the storing step is
demanded. For generating the pass phrases the same demands
concerning the choice of parameters and random hardware
apply as with the key generation.
f) Deliver: As the private key should eventually reach
the participant, it must be delivered to him. Hereby it is
necessary that the token surely and solely reaches the intended
participant. Further, it must be ensured that no one is able to
eavesdrop on the key or manipulate or intercept the token.
Delivering the respective pass phrase must also be subject to
massive shielding measures. See also [17] for more work on
this.
g) Use: Using the private key is the really intended sense
for having it. However, it must be ensured that the authorized
participant can easily use the key while this must be impossible
for all other parties. Further, the key must be protected from
eavesdropping, manipulating or interchange.
h) Destruct: The last thing in a private key’s life is its
destruction. Although destructing a key seems to be easy there
are some things to be attended. If the key is to be destroyed, it
is necessary to do it in a way that the key cannot be restored
anymore. Thus, throwing away the token or simple file deletion
from the hard disk are no appropriate ways to destruct a private
key.
B. Own and Foreign Private Keys
As we will have to distinguish between own and foreign
private keys later, these terms are defined now.
Definition 1: A private key is called a participant’s own
private key if and only if the participant is entitled to use
this private key.
Usually the participant, which is associated with the corre-
sponding public key2, is entitled to use the private key and
thus, is its owner. However, sometimes it can be a quiet
different participant. If, for example, an employee leaves
the company, the superior might be the new legal owner
of the employee’s decryption key to be able to decrypt the
employee’s business documents.
Definition 2: A private key is a foreign private key to a
participant if and only if it is not the participant’s own private
key.
Thus, being the owner of a private key and being foreign
to a private key are mutually exclusive. At any given point
in time and for any given combination of a participant and a
private key exactly one of these predicates is true.
C. Security of private keys
Following [4] the private key is sufficient and necessary
for decrypting a cipher or creating a signature. Thus, having
secure private keys is a necessary condition for having a
secure public key infrastructure. However, it is not a sufficient
condition for that. If the involved processes like registering the
participants or the communication with and within the trust
center are unreliable, the whole public key infrastructure is
insecure. However, those problems are not addressed here. Our
scope is only the secure management of private keys within a
hierarchical public key infrastructure.
The basic idea for securing private keys is that foreign
private keys are nobody’s concern. However, as seen above
there are some stations and tasks concerning a private key,
which require attention, expertise and a suitable environment.
We cannot expect the ordinary public key infrastructure end
user fulfilling these requirements [18]. Thus, it is better to give
all those tasks to one party and control it adequate. Following
this approach, we will define a trust center module called
key authority (KA), which potentiates the easy enforcement
of secure management of private keys.
Depending on the used technology and policy, more or less
tasks have to be fulfilled by KA. When using high-grade smart
cards with key generation features and having no key backup
2e.g. in the certificate
the KA is concerned only with the issuer private keys for
signing the certificate. When using soft tokens and key backup
the KA is concerned in addition with the full range of user
key generation, deposition, recovery, and so on. Even if the
KA does not execute certain tasks, it can at least increase
their security by prearranging those tasks. An example for this
case is the usage of the private key. This is naturally a task
to be done at the end user’s side. However, KA can enforce
its security by issuing active tokens, which do not reveal the
private key at all.
III. CORE KEY AUTHORITY
In order to comprehend the specification of the key authority
it is necessary to have a common vocabulary. Thus, this
section gives definitions of some relevant terms, which are
new or might be mistakable. Further, it introduces some
simplifications to ease the definition of the key authority.
A. Issuer
In hierarchical public key infrastructures, there is at least
one dedicated participant, who issues the certificates. Each of
those participants has at least one distinguished name and at
least one private key for issuing the certificates. Further, each
of those participants may respectively issue certificates using
several distinguished names and private keys. In order to have
clear circumstances we define the term issuer as follows.
Definition 3: An issuer is a participant within a hierarchical
public key infrastructure, which has exactly and exclusively
one distinguished name. This participant has exactly and
exclusively one valid private key for issuing certificates at a
point of time.
Thus, each of the mentioned three components (issuer, dis-
tinguished name and valid private key) does non-ambiguously
determine the respective two others. An issuer may have more
tasks than issuing certificates3 and several private keys for
accomplishing those tasks. Further, an issuer might use several
private keys for certifying over the time, but only one of them
will be valid at a point of time.
B. Core Public Key Infrastructure
A public key infrastructure may consist of a number of
smaller sub public key infrastructures, which are connected
by means of bridging, cross certifying or somehow else.
Those sub public key infrastructures in turn may consist of
smaller sub public key infrastructures and so on. This can
lead to complicated relationships between the involved trust
centers, issuers, participants and their keys. In order to avoid
misunderstandings in the further, discussion we introduce to
the following simplification of a public key infrastructure.
Definition 4: An issuer’s core public key infrastructure is
part of a whole public key infrastructure. It contains exactly
those trust center products4, which were issued by the respec-
tive issuer. Further, it consists of exactly those participants and
clients, which deal with those trust center products.
3e.g. revoking certificates
4key pairs, certificates, tokens, etc.
Thus, every issuer has exactly one core public key infras-
tructure and every core public key infrastructure belongs to
exactly one issuer.
C. Defining the Core Key Authority
We are now ready to define the core key authority. This
is done by defining, which tasks the authority has within the
core public key infrastructure.
Definition 5: An issuer’s core key authority executes ex-
actly and exclusively those tasks within the core public key
infrastructure which require or enable the access to the issuer’s
own private keys or to any foreign private keys.
All other parties are not allowed to get in touch with any
private keys except their own ones. Although the key authority
is in principle allowed to handle foreign private keys, the
regarding owners of those might5 deny the access to their
private keys. Thus, the motto is ”If someone is allowed to
see foreign private keys, it is the core key authority and no
one else”.
D. Tasks
The above definition of the core key authority gives a
general description of its tasks. This subsection gives a more
concrete specification of them. We describe all tasks, which
require or enable the access to the issuer’s or foreign private
keys.
1) Issuing: The core key authority issues certificates on
behalf of its issuer. Issuing the certificates means signing them
with the issuer’s appropriate private key.
2) Revocation: If it is the issuer’s task to revoke certificates
this is done by its core key authority, too. Revoking a certifi-
cate means signing a certificate revocation list6 containing that
certificate with the appropriate private key.
3) Remaining Private Keys: The issuer might have addi-
tional private keys for accomplishing various tasks. All those
tasks will be done by the issuer’s core key authority because
no one else is allowed to use the issuer’s private keys.
4) Key Generation: The core key authority generates all
key pairs, which are not generated by their respective owners
for themselves. This is because generating keys implies the
access to them, which is granted only to the owner and the key
authority. Of course, the key authority generates the respective
issuer’s key pairs.
5) Personalization: If the core key authority has generated
a key pair, it has to store the private key within a personal
security environment. As personal security environments are
protected by (strong) pass phrases7 it is also the core key
authority’s task to generate them and to inform the regarding
owner about them. This is the key authority’s task as possess-
ing the personal security environment and knowing the pass
phrase enables the access to the stored keys.
5according to the trust center’s policy
6or a similar data structure
7or similar mechanisms
6) Archiving/Backup/Recovery: When a private key has to
be archived, backuped or recovered it is the task of the core
key authority to do so if the respective owner does not do this.
Any other parties are not allowed to do this, as they are not
allowed to see foreign private keys.
E. Secure Key Management
This sections shows why the core key authority defined
above enables an easy enforcement of secure private key man-
agement within a core public key infrastructure by enabling
the leverage of suitable technical and organizational measures.
1) Easy Enforcement of Security: As the core key authority
is the only party within the core public key infrastructure,
which has access to the issuer’s private key or to foreign pri-
vate keys, one can protect those keys by just protecting the core
key authority. This is manageable because you have to protect
only one party instead of many. Further, it is uncomplicated
because this party is located within a known environment8
instead of somewhere in any participant’s environment. Thus,
it is easy to enforce secure key management with suitable (and
well-known) technical and organizational measures.
2) Technical Measures: As all crucial private keys are
under full control of the carrier of the core public key
infrastructure9, it is possible to use all kinds of common
technical measures for protecting keys. Examples for those
measures are physical shielding, cryptographic hardware and
more.
3) Organizational Measures: As with the technical mea-
sures, the use of common organizational measures for protect-
ing the private keys is enabled by the centralized maintenance
of crucial tasks. Those measures include running in offline
mode, dual control10 and so on.
IV. KEY AUTHORITY
This section explains how an arbitrary public key infras-
tructure can be seen as a composite of several core public key
infrastructures. Further, it is shown that the security achieved
by using a core key authority11 is automatically passed to a
composite public key infrastructure.
A. Public Key Infrastructures
Any (conventional) hierarchical public key infrastructure
can be seen as a collection of connected core public key infras-
tructures. From the view of the core public key infrastructure,
the ”other” issuers appear as normal participants. From the
view of the whole public key infrastructure, the various core
issuers appear as cross-certified or bridged sub public key
infrastructures. Figure 2 shows an example of a composed
public key infrastructure tree.
8at the trust center
9by being assembled within the core key authority
10always two operators must be logged in
11within a core public key infrastructure
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A PKI AS COMPOSITION OF CORE PKIS
B. Key Authority
The various core key authorities may be operated within
one module. This module is exclusively for assembling several
core key authorities and is called key authority. It provides
the environment to share the technical and organizational
measures between the miscellaneous core key authorities. Each
core key authority is operated within exactly one key authority
and each key authority contains at least one core key authority.
If there is exactly one core key authority within a key authority
the two terms are synonymous.
C. Security
All tasks concerning issuer private keys or foreign private
keys are conducted within a key authority. As shown above it
is easy to protect (core) key authorities. Thus, we can easily
enforce the secure key management within the whole public
key infrastructure.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper introduced a finite state machine model for a
private keys life cycle. This model was used to identify the
various tasks concerning private keys. Based on this the key
authority, a trust center module, which performs all tasks
concerning private issuer keys or foreign private keys was
introduced. It was shown that using this module allows for
an easy enforcement of secure key management within a
hierarchical public key infrastructure.
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